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Digital Steganography continues to evolve today, where steganographers are con-
stantly discovering new methodologies to hide information effectively. Despite
this, steganographic attacks, which seek to defeat these techniques, have contin-
ually lagged behind. The reason for this is simple: it is exceptionally difficult to
defeat the unknown. Most attacks require prior knowledge or study of existing
techniques in order to defeat them, and are often highly specific to certain cover
media. These constraints are impractical and unrealistic to defeat steganography
in modern communication networks. It follows, an effective steganographic attack
must not require prior knowledge or study of techniques, and must be capable of
being implemented against any type of cover media.
Our Discrete Spring Transform (DST) is a highly adaptable steganographic
attack that can be applied to any type of cover media. While there are many
steganographic attacks that claim to be blind, the DST is one of only a few attacks
that does not require training, or prior knowledge of steganographic techniques to
defeat them. Furthermore, the DST is one of the only attack frameworks that can
be easily tuned and adapted.
In this dissertation, my work on the Discrete Spring Transform will be formally
analyzed for its use as an effective steganographic attack. The effectiveness of the
attack will be assessed against numerous steganographic algorithms in a variety of
cover media. My research will show that the Discrete Spring Transform is a highly
effective attack methodology that can be used to defeat countless steganographic
algorithms.
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3Chapter 1
Introduction
Covert communication is by nature a highly adversarial discipline where one
person attempts to communicate securely, and the other attempts to disrupt,
prevent, or discover said communication. Digital cryptography and steganography
are two such methods for covert communication that have been developed over
the last several decades. While the goal of cryptography is to securely protect
the delivery of information, steganography’s goal is to disguise the existence of
information altogether. In this manner, steganography can be an attractive method
for covert communication, where unlike cryptography, the entire existence of the
communication is concealed. The advantage of steganography over cryptography
lies in the fact that cryptographic communication is often very obvious and can be
easily prevented or intercepted by a third party, whereas with steganography, the
entire existence of information is very difficult to determine [8,9].
While steganographic techniques have continued to be enhanced in their so-
phistication and proliferation, steganographic attacks have historically failed to
match their pace. In fact, many modern steganographic techniques are engineered
to thwart many basic methods of disruption and detection [10]. Therefore, in much
the same way that security researchers respond to threats after they are discovered,
steganographic attackers must discover techniques to combat them after they are
4known. In this regard, steganographic attackers have continually been on the
losing side of this battle. Furthermore, in the last several decades, the proliferation
of media on the internet has exploded, making analysis, study, and prevention
of steganographic communication impractical for a case-by-case basis. In order
to truly respond to and thwart steganographic communications, a methodology
which is highly adaptable, and capable of blindly attacking steganography is
required.
Steganography is considered to be defeated when either the communication
is discovered or prevented [8,9]; in other words, the content of the message does
not need to be known to defeat steganography. If follows that the most direct
method of attacking steganography is to use an active approach methodology,
where an attack attempts to actively disrupt or interrupt communication. Al-
though the vast majority of steganographic attacks rely on passive (steganalysis)
methods, which analyze a media to assess the likelihood it contains steganograhic
data, these techniques are impractical for defeating steganography. The reason
is that passive detection always requires some training or analysis of existing
steganographic methods to be effective. Even passive techniques which claim to
be blind require unrealistic training or machine learning processes [11–14]. In
contrast, active attack methodologies can be implemented against any type of
cover media or steganographic algorithm. Why then have active approaches been
overshadowed by passive techniques? The reason is that active approaches are
considered destructive, unpredictable, and difficult to tune or adapt. For example,
while Stirmark [15,16] (a widely used active steganographic framework) is widely
used as an active attack framework (typically for testing robustness of stegano-
graphic techniques), virtually no researchers have given it serious consideration as
a steganographic attack for the aforementioned reasons. It follows that an active
5attack methodology that is non-destructive, predictable, and effective is required
to realistically defeat steganography.
The Discrete Spring Transform (DST) that we have developed is an active,
highly adaptable, non-destructive steganographic attack. Unlike other active
attack methodologies, the DST has been engineered to attack any number of
steganographic algorithms in virtually any type of digital media [1–7]. The basis
for the DST lies in exploiting a fundamental constraint of all steganographic
algorithms, which is, numeric stability of a digital media is required for successful
steganographic communication. In other words, the numeric values of a digital
media are required to remain somewhat constant in order for a media to be
successfully used for steganographic communication. While this initially seems
like a reasonable constraint, given that changes in a media’s numeric values seem
likely to distort or alter the quality of the media, countless research has been
produced which indicates that this is not true [17]. By exploiting this weakness,
we have developed an attack that is efficient, effective, and adaptable to effectively
defeat steganography.
In this Dissertation, my work on the Discrete Spring Transform (DST) will
be formally described, modeled, and shown to be an effective steganographic
attack. A methodology for tuning and adapting the DST will be formally described
and applied to defeat numerous types of steganographic techniques in a variety
of cover media. The results of my research will show that the DST is a next-
generation, highly adaptable steganographic attack, capable of defeating even the
most advanced steganographic schemes in highly distributed environments.
6Chapter 2
Motivation
Covert communications have been in use for hundreds of years and continue
to evolve today. Some of the most prolific moments in history have involved
uncovering or intercepting secret communications. Julius Caesar was thought to
have used ciphers to communicate with his legions in ancient times [18]. The
German Army engineered the Enigma cipher machine as a highly robust way
for the third Reich to communicate, and the cracking of the Enigma in World
War II was arguably a major turning point for the allies [19]. The invention of
public key cryptosystems transformed network security and ushered in a new
era of secure communications [20]. Countless other equally profound moments
have involved the use of covert and secure communication systems. Despite the
wide variety in these scenarios and the sophistication of the techniques involved,
the one constant is the adversarial nature of secure communication. This classic
dilemma is illustrated nicely by the prisoner’s problem. In the prisoner’s problem,
two prisoners are attempting to communicate securely by passing messages to
each other through a warden [21]. The communication between the prisoners
is considered secure if the true content of the message cannot be discovered by
the warden [21]. Furthermore, if the prisoners want to disguise the existence of
the message altogether, then the communication is only considered secure if the
7warden cannot determine with certainty that the message contains any covert
communication [21]. It follows that all secure communications have at least three
parties involved: The sender, the recipient, and the attacker.
While the sender and recipient have many methods of communicating covertly,
what happens if the physical delivery of the information is compromised? Any
intelligent attacker would quickly be able to realize certain communication streams
are using certain blatant covert communication methods and disrupt or otherwise
prevent the successful delivery of this information. How then can two individuals
communicate without having their communication channel interrupted? One
solution to this problem is to disguise the entire existence of covert communication
altogether. This practice is referred to as steganography, and involves transporting
information in a manner that is seemingly innocuous [8,9]. Digital steganography
typically involves encoding information within a digital communication medium
with a large data capacity, such as a digital audio, image, or video source, or
any other large benign file [8,9]. Unlike cryptography, where an attacker can be
reasonably certain that a certain communication stream contains covert data, with
steganography, the distinction is almost impossible. An attacker cannot simply
disrupt or prevent all content from being transported, as the vast majority of data
is benign. In this regard, steganography is an attractive method to distribute covert
data on communication networks. As a result, preventing secret communication
when steganography is involved is a much more difficult problem to address if
one simply wishes to end the covert communication.
Over the years, the proliferation of personal computers have made covert
communication through digital cryptography and steganography very simple for
virtually anyone to implement and use. Anyone with a computer and access
to cryptographic or steganographic software can potentially become a sender
8in the prisoner’s problem using any number of freely available software suites.
Furthermore, the widespread availability of communication and media outlets
on the internet has also made it simple to proliferate covert communications to
virtually any place at any time. While nearly all secure communications have
an innocent purpose, there are nefarious individuals that will seek to use covert
communication for their own ends. Over the years there have been relatively
few concrete discoveries of steganography being used in the wild, but those that
have been found have had disturbing implications. In [22], a terrorist cell was
found using steganography to encode the plans of an upcoming attack within a
video. Another similar example revealed that intelligence agents had been using
steganographic software to encode information [23]. A more benign but equally
important example found that a software company had been secretly encoding
screenshots generated by their software [24]. The real threat of steganography in
modern communication networks is that the content is often untrusted and unreg-
ulated, allowing anyone to encode and hide malicious information anonymously
and alongside the rest of the benign information. For this reason, the warden,
or attacker serves an important purpose in the ecosystem for secure and covert
communication networks.
While interrupting communication via cryptography is a simple manner (the
attacker simply disrupts the communication channel), defeating steganography is a
much more difficult and profound problem for attackers to address. Over the years,
countless techniques have been established which can uncover numerous types of
stego-data and algorithms in a variety of media [8,9], however, these attacks suffer
from a fundamental issue: they require knowledge of the algorithm they intend
to defeat. In other words, attacks against covert communication methodologies
have involved a discovery phase, where a new methodology is discovered for
9secure communication, followed by an attack phase, where individuals attempt
to find methods of disrupting or defeating this newly found communication
system. While this is typical of most security fields, it is simply impractical
to fully address the issue at hand. Any clever steganographer could monitor
current attack schemes, and modify their techniques accordingly. Furthermore,
this modification is often trivial for a steganographer to make. In fact, making
slight changes to certain mechanics of an encoding algorithm can bypass certain
detection schemes entirely. In order to truly disrupt steganography, an attacking
method that is blind and does not require study of steganographic schemes is
required. In this manner, prevention can be implemented against any digital media
that is considered suspect. While many have attempted to develop blind attack
methodologies [11–14], nearly all existing approaches require a training phase,
which again, requires knowledge of the steganographic attacks they intend to
defeat.
It follows that attackers have yet to discover a truly blind methodology for
attacking steganography. In this regard, those wishing to use covert communica-
tion for nefarious purposes need only monitor the current steganographic attack
methodologies and modify their algorithms accordingly. Clearly, this cat and
mouse game is a losing battle for attackers, as discovery is often the most difficult
component of developing an attack. To truly address the threat of covert com-
munication using steganography, an attack methodology that is highly adaptive,
blind, and efficient is required. This is the motivation behind our Discrete Spring
Transform, which is an attack that seeks to be truly blind, highly adaptable, and
efficient in attacking modern digital steganography.
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Chapter 3
Background
There has been extensive research in both steganographic algorithms and corre-
sponding attacks over the last several decades. I will attempt to briefly review
modern steganographic algorithms and attacks. The intent of this review is not
to provide a comprehensive list of existing techniques and attacks, but rather to
highlight the various types of methods that exist.
An important preface for this section is in relation to the definition of steganog-
raphy versus watermarking. It is commonly accepted by researchers that water-
marking always constitutes a positive or non-nefarious goal whereas steganog-
raphy is not always benign [8, 9, 25, 26]. This distinction has led to branches in
research where attackers generally ignore watermarking in lieu of steganography.
Fundamentally however, both watermarking and steganography hide information
within cover media, regardless of the intention of the encoder. For this reason
we treat watermaking and steganographic techniques identically since they both
fundamentally accomplish the same end-goal. In the context of steganographic
attacks, it is important to recognize that the intention of the steganographer is
unknown. The positive or nefarious intentions of a steganographer cannot be
understood by an attacker, and assessing this is difficult and outside the scope of
this research.
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3.1 Steganographic Techniques
The body of research that has been conducted in steganographic techniques is
overwhelming (see [8,9]), especially when compared with the existing research
of steganographic attacks. Despite the fact that steganography is inherently
an adversarial game, steganographers have an exceptionally simpler task than
attackers, if for no other reason that steganographers have a larger body of research
at their disposal.
Providing a comprehensive analysis of existing steganographic techniques is
not feasible for this dissertation, however, I will attempt to highlight important
techniques and categories of methods.
3.1.1 First Generation Steganography - Least Significant Bit
Least significant bit steganography involves modifying the raw bit representation
of a media to encode information. This type of steganography is applicable for any
type of media that has a digital representation and is often the simplest type of
steganography to implement. Methods that encode information in audio, images,
and video are prevalent [8,9,27–33] and despite the fact that such methods are
often simple to uncover or destroy, researchers continue to find more sophisticated
methods of using LSB techniques.
These types of techniques were groundbreaking at the time of their discovery
but have since been considered antiquated due to the fact they often leave very
telling signs of manipulation for attackers to discover. Despite this fact, LSB
steganography continues to be researched to this day and new techniques are
constantly emerging which offer various tradeoffs for capacity, robustness, and
ease of implementation.
12
3.1.2 Second Generation Techniques - Transform Domains
Almost immediately after LSB steganography had begun to emerge, steganogra-
phers began encoding information in alternative representations of cover media. It
was discovered that encoding information within alternative transform domains,
such as the frequency domain, can produce robust, high capacity techniques that
are more difficult to uncover by attackers. Such techniques are more difficult to
detect because the information within the media is spread more evenly and can
observe cover media statistics more easily than LSB techniques.
Some of the most prolific steganographic techniques utilize transform domains,
including F5, Outguess, and JSteg [34,35]. In fact, one of the most cited and most
prolific methods of encoding information within images involves using Spread-
Spectrum techniques to encode a spreading-sequence in the DCT coefficients of
an image [26]. Despite the fact these methods ushered in a new generation of
steganographic techniques, they often suffer from the same problems that LSB
methods do since they can be easily discovered if they fail to observe known
statistical metrics of the cover media. In fact, one can abstract most LSB techniques
to an alternative domain quite easily. The major contribution of these methods is
the realization that a cover media can contain information in an alternative domain.
It follows that for a given transform domain N, one can simply encode information
in the (N + 1)th domain as long as they observe the statistical properties of that
domain.
3.1.3 Advanced Techniques - Robustness Against Attack
Modern steganographers have begun to realize that an algorithm is ineffective if
it is not robust against attacks and have started implementing techniques which
13
are immune to active attack methods. The majority of these techniques attempt to
embed information within target components which are thought to be critically
important to the perception of the media. In this manner, information is embed-
ded within components of a media that must remain unharmed to be properly
perceived, thus in theory keeping stego-data safe from destruction.
The majority of such techniques have been directed at audio and image-derived
steganography. In terms of image steganography, Rotation Scaling and Translation
(RST) resistant techniques are the most prolific types of techniques. These methods
are capable of resisting distortion introduced by basic spatial operations [10,36–41].
These techniques are some of the first within image-steganography that have
directly addressed the issues presented when an active attacker is attempting to
thwart a steganographic scheme.
Likewise within audio-steganogrpahy several approaches have been made to
deter the effect of Time-Scale Modification (TSM) on embedding techniques [42–45].
Such techniques are capable of resisting distortion that might be introduced
through alterations to an audio sequence’s time-scale. Again, these techniques
operate by encoding information in a way that it is always encoded within critically
important sections of the audio-sequence. The concept is that altering the time-
scale where the embedding takes place should significantly degrade the audio
quality.
Often these attack-resisting techniques are concerned more strictly with main-
taining integrity than covering their existence, however, it is not difficult to imagine
a scenario where a steganographer combines algorithms which are robust against
attacks with algorithms that avoid detection in order to form a method that is both
highly robust and transparent. For this reason, we believe the next generation of
steganographic techniques will fall into this category of implementation.
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3.2 Passive Steganographic Attacks
Despite the fact that digital steganography has been heavily researched for the last
several decades, steganographic attacks have historically lagged behind techniques.
The reason for this is simple, it is difficult and sometimes impossible to anticipate
or counterattack the unknown. As a result, the vast majority of attacks fall into
the passive attack model, where a media is scanned or otherwise checked for the
existence of stegnographic data.
In general, passive steganographic attacks are referred to as steganalysis which
is the study of a cover media to determine if it contains any suspect or hidden
information [8]. The goal of steganalysis is not to discover the actual hidden
information within a cover media, but rather to determine the existence of the
stego-data, since steganography is considered defeated if the existence of the
information is known.
3.2.1 First Generation Steganalysis - Statistical Modeling
The first generation of steganalysis attacks is based on the concept of determining
a set of statistics or known base metrics for certain types of cover media and
comparing suspect media against these statistics. The attacks described in [46–51]
are typical examples of how known statistics of a cover media can be used to
uncover the existence of hidden stego-data. The concept behind these attacks is
always that a steganographic technique will alter the normal statistics of a media
in a telling way. These attacks are called first generation attacks because they
are highly specialized to certain types of cover media and corresponding attacks.
Despite the fact these techniques can be quite successful, they are unrealistic
in practice. As a steganographer becomes aware of existing attacks, they can
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effectively thwart the attack by adhering to the expected statistics or metrics of the
attack. Likewise, a steganographer can simply shift their algorithm to a different
domain of the cover media, for example encoding information within the frequency
domain, and defeat most attacks that look for statistics within the spatial domain.
3.2.2 Advanced Steganalysis - Machine Learning
Despite the fact that it is exceptionally difficult to detect algorithms that have
not been studied, several steganalysis techniques have attempted to resolve this
shortcoming using various methods. Techniques that are based on Support Vector
Machines (SVM) have been employed which attempt to classify stego-data using
machine learning methods [11–14]. In this manner, an SVM-based system may be
trained to recognize media that are likely to contain steganographic data. In theory
this overcomes the limitations of passive steganography since a machine can be
trained to recognize stego-media. Other researchers have proposed alterations or
enhancements to the learning method with varying degrees of success [52,53] but
at the core of each technique the concept of machine-learning is employed.
Once again, these methods suffer from the possibility that a steganographer
will simply design their algorithm to avoid detection by these specific attacks. Fur-
thermore, providing a sufficiently large set of media to train the machine-learning
algorithm typically requires knowledge of existing steganographic techniques,
which defeats the entire purpose of a blind general purpose attack.
3.3 Active Steganographic Attacks
As previously stated, the majority of steganographic attacks are passive in nature.
Despite this, numerous approaches have been discovered to attack steganogra-
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phy in an active way. Most approaches that utilize this methodology introduce
distortions to cover media in a certain manner. The reason these approaches are
effective is that a cover media’s numeric values are often not strictly important
in the perception of the media [54–57]. In other words, a cover media’s numeric
values can be changed or distorted to a certain degree without affecting the quality
of the media too severely. However, a cover media’s numeric representation is
extremely important when encoding stego-data and even slight distortions can
render a steganographic scheme ineffective [58–61].
Despite the fact that the active attack model was postulated several decades
ago [21,62] there are surprisingly few implementations that have been discovered.
Active attacks are in fact so rare that many researchers simply model attacks
as random noise, where several researchers have discussed the effect of combat-
ing steganography using noise [63]. Likewise, various other methods have been
proposed which seek to eliminate steganography using distortion or spatial trans-
forms [15,16], but these techniques are often limited to specific cover media and
the effectiveness of the attacks is not well understood.
Other researchers have proposed specific implementations of active attacks that
are targeted at specific types of cover media that have been shown to be effective
at removing steganographic data [64–66]. These approaches are certainly in the
right direction for an active steganographic framework but still lack the generality
and adaptability that is required of a modern active attack.
Lastly, one unique approach that has been proposed is attacking steganography
at the network layer to combat the covert channel on the internet [67]. This
approach is novel in that the authors proposed an attack that was not strictly
targeted at the application layer. However, the attack is still rather primitive and is
not intelligently targeted at cover media but at internet traffic as a whole.
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3.4 Steganographic Attack Frameworks
A steganographic framework is a collection of tools or attacks that can be used to
discover or remove steganography within a cover media. Most frameworks that
exist today are simple collections of existing attacks and leave the decision of how
to attack or disrupt a media to the end-user of the framework.
3.4.1 Stegdetect
Stegdetect is a component of the Outguess framework [68, 69] that is a suite of
steganographic tools that can be used to discover the existence of JPEG steganog-
raphy within cover media. Stegdetect essentially is an aggregate tool suite that
attempts to uncover cover media that have been encoded using JSteg, JPHide, or
Outguess techniques for encoding information [68]. The tool itself is passive in
nature and simply aggregates existing steganalysis methods. This framework is
unsuitable for the needs of a modern steganographic framework since it exclusively
utilizes passive techniques to detect cover media within JPEG images.
3.4.2 Reference Framework
The framework proposed in [70] suggests a method for discovering steganography
within images using image references. The concept behind the algorithm is
assembling a collection of non-encoded images and using the reference colors
within said images to compare against suspected cover media. The methodology is
unrealistic for a modern steganographic framework since it requires assembling a
large library of reference images and likewise uses passive steganalysis techniques.
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3.4.3 Stirmark
Stirmark has arguably been the most prolific steganographic framework to emerge
from steganographic research in the last two decades [15,16]. Stirmark contains
a collection of active attacks that introduce distortions to cover media in various
ways. These distortions exploit the fact that steganographic schemes require a
certain stability in the numeric values of a cover media. Despite the fact that
Stirmark has been strongly accepted within the research community (at the time
of this writing over 75 publications within IEEE Xplore have cited Stirmark since
2005), it still lacks many components of a modern attacking framework, including
the ability to adapt to various types of cover media (Stirmark is predominately
concerned with attacking image and audio-derived media), and the ability to
be used on a massive scale (Stirmark requires a lot of manual intervention and
decision making for the end-user to effectively use it).
Stirmark has certainly paved the way for modern steganographic attack frame-
works but there are significant improvements that must be made before it can be
used to combat steganography on the internet and many of the attacks within the
framework are based on intuition rather than concrete results.
3.5 Summary
As evident, steganography has been heavily researched both in terms of techniques
that encode and hide information and techniques that attack or attempt to remove
hidden information. Despite the fact that steganographic techniques continue to
increase in their sophistication, attacks continue to lag behind. Several groups of
researchers continue to make efforts to remedy this shortcoming within the field,
however, current techniques are still limited for several reasons.
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Despite the overwhelming body of research into steganalysis, such techniques
are still flawed in their ability to quickly adapt to new steganographic schemes,
and even techniques which claim to implement blind attacks require a learning
process. Several researchers have begun to understand the importance of active
attacks and frameworks, however, these efforts are few when compared to passive
methodologies.
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Chapter 4
An Effective Steganographic Attack
Steganography, in its most simplistic definition, is a method with which to dis-
guise the existence of information. Like cryptography, it is often used to send
information covertly or in a manner that information is not easily intercepted by
an attacker. It is therefore quite reasonable to describe cryptography and steganog-
raphy using traditional communication network paradigms. In this manner, digital
steganography resembles a communication network, where the stego data is the
signal and the digital media is the channel. Although an attacker has any number
of methods at their disposal to defeat a communication network, most network
attacks are based on the concept of jamming the channel by introducing noise or
distortion. Despite this realization, most steganographic attackers rely on passive
approaches for discovering the existence of steganography. The reason being that
one wishes to avoid introducing unnecessary distortions or negative impacts to the
attacked media. However, discovery is insufficient to prevent the actual communi-
cation from occurring, and even once the communication is identified, the optimal
response mechanism for dealing with the communication is unclear. As a result,
an effective steganographic attack must take a more active approach to defeating
steganography in order to directly prevent steganographic communication while
minimizing unnecessary disruptions.
21
4.1 Steganography Numeric Stability
Consider a steganographic function S(X, D) = Y that accepts a cover media X and
stego-data D and produces an encoded stego-media Y which contains D. Likewise,
consider its corresponding inverse function S−1(Y) = D which accepts an encoded
stego-media Y and produces the encoded stego-data D. For S to maintain proper
communication during transmission, the Bit Error Rate (BER) of the scheme must
remain above a certain threshold β (β may vary depending on the scheme in place
and other error-prevention mechanisms such as Forward-Error Correction).
Let Yˆ = Y+ e = S(X, D) + e be a transmitted cover media, where e is an error
or noise signal. For Y to be properly received the relationship:
∑ S−1(Yˆ)− S−1(Y)
N
< β (4.1)
must be preserved, where N is the size of D.
4.2 Performance
When attempting to blindly defeat steganography, an attacker has no definitive
knowledge of the steganographic algorithm in use nor the information that is
being encoded. Knowledge of this information would mean that the stegano-
graphic algorithm has already been defeated. As such, in a typical scenario of
blind steganographic attacks, the steganographic algorithm S and the data D are
considered completely unknown to an attacker. We therefore must define a metric
of describing how effective a steganographic attack is against a steganographic
algorithm without having any knowledge of S and D.
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4.2.1 Steganographic Embedding Set
Conceptually, all steganographic algorithms embed information by altering values
in a digital media. For a given media X and data set D, S must always produce a
media Y using a known and consistent method. That is, for distinct S, X, and D,
Y must also be distinct to be properly received. Therefore, there is always a set of
digital values in Y that are used to carry steganographic data. By introducing errors
into these information carriers in Y, one may defeat a steganographic algorithm in
the same manner a communication network may fail under a poor Signal-to-Noise
Ratio.
For a given steganographic algorithm S, let E(S, X, D) be the Embedding Set of
digital values for S, X, and D. We define the Embedding Set as the set of values in
X that carry steganographic information for a given S, X, and D. Although E may
vary significantly for different S, X, and D we know that the following properties
must hold true for all E:
• ∀e ∈ E(S, X, D), e ∈ X
• ∀s ∈ S, x ∈ X, d ∈ D ∃ E(x, s, d) s.t. |E(s, x, d)| ≥ 1
• d1, d2 ∈ D, d1 6= d2, E(S, X, d) 6= E(S, X, d)
This derivation assumes that for a fixed S and D, the size of E remains fixed as
well, and henceforth we denote the size of the embedding set E as ρ.
4.2.2 Quantization-based Embedding
Along with the selection of the embedding set, a steganographic algorithm S
must also alter the values within the embedding set in a distinct manner. My
research has focused this derivation on steganographic algorithms which utilize
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quantization embedding. A quantization embedding method is any manner of
altering a value within the embedding set E such that the value assumes one of
several fixed quantization levels. Given S, X, d ∈ D, α a quantization strength, and
A quantization levels, the embedding process for E(X, S, d) may be described as
follows:
∀e ∈ E(X, S, d), eˆ = e+ nα
2A
(4.2)
where n = −A,−A+ 1, . . . , A− 1, A. n is chosen for each d ∈ D and e ∈ E and
may be selected randomly depending on the steganographic scheme in place.
For instance, if one considers a method which uses a spreading-sequence or
random code to embed information within each embedding set, the selection of n
is essentially randomized.
Using an embedding scheme E and a quantization-embedding method, an
encoded stego-media Y may be found as follows:
Y =

x x /∈ E
xˆ x ∈ E
(4.3)
Using this definition of Y, we can approximate the BER of S for Y and Yˆ (where
Yˆ is the attacked version of Y) as:
BER(Y, Yˆ) ≈ ∑
y∈Y
(yˆ− y)e(y)
αN
(4.4)
where N = |D| and
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e(x) =

0, x /∈ E
1, x ∈ E
(4.5)
4.2.3 Performance Metric
Once again, certain components of equation 4.4 are unknown to the attacker such
as the embedding set E, the quantization strength and size α and A, and the
message length N. However, unlike prior definitions of the performance of a
steganographic scheme S, equation 4.4 is written entirely in terms of Y, which is
critical as the basis of a performance metric.
As a result, we introduce a metric which we call the steganographic per-
formance factor P that allows an attacker to approximate the BER of S. The
performance factor P(Y, Yˆ) can be found as:
P(Y, Yˆ) = ∑
y∈Y
(y− yˆ)p(y)
αN
(4.6)
where p(y) is a probability density function approximating the location of embed-
ding values in X, such that:
p(y = 1) =
ρ
|X|
∫ 1
0
f (y)dx (4.7)
and |X| is the size of the cover media and ρ the size of the embedding set. f (x),
should be a probability density function thought to best approximate the location
of embedding values in X, most likely this will be a uniform distribution. The
probability distribution is scaled by ρ|X| to account for the possibility that a single
value in X may hold steganographic data for multiple embedding sets in E.
Despite the fact that it is impossible for an attacker to know α, N, and p(y),
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these values can be approximated or assumed as a worst-case scenario. For
instance, if the attacker assumed that each value in X was within an embedding
set in E, and that α and N (the embedding strength and message length) were
both very large, the attacker would attempt to heavily distort each value in X
with severity. This is, of course, a poor assumption, since a steganographer would
attempt to make the existence of stego-data as transparent as possible, but the
point remains that these constants may be tuned by the attacker depending on
how suspect the cover media appears to be.
Using approximations of α, N, and p(y), an attacker must observe the following
inequality to defeat a steganographic scheme:
∑
y∈Y
(y− yˆ)p(y)
αN
≥ β (4.8)
where β is the minimum performance score thought to defeat a steganographic
algorithm. Typically, even small β values are sufficient to defeat a steganographic
algorithm, but the worst case scenario would attempt to reach a factor of 0.5,
which is somewhat analogous to a BER of 0.5, indicating the message is completely
unrecoverable.
4.3 Quality
A steganographic attack must also preserve the perceptual characteristics of a
media to be successful. That is, an attacked digital media must remain perceptually
identical to another but is not required to retain numeric characteristics. Perceptual
identity is difficult to assess and is often described on a per-media basis as will be
elaborated in the following sections.
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4.3.1 Perceptual Identity
A digital media’s perception is not strictly tied to its numeric representation. This
is an obvious observation if one simply considers the various ways human beings
may perceive objects. Subtle changes in light, saturation, color, etc, all often go
unnoticed by human observers, yet said changes can have a drastic impact on the
raw quantitative measure of a media, that is, its numeric representation.
We define a function S as the perceptual similarity of two media X and Y as
follows:
S(X,Y) = τ (4.9)
where τ is a numeric value between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates the media are
completely perceptually identical, and 0 that they are not perceptually identical. A
value between 0 and 1 simply means that the media has lost some of its perceptual
quality. This loss in perceptual quality typically signifies distortion that impacts
the perception of the media, or various other operations that may also negatively
impact its quality. Historically, S has been measured in terms of the raw numeric
discrepancies between two media via Mean Squared Error.
4.3.1.1 Peak Signal to Noise Ratio
Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) measures the raw numeric differences between
two discrete signals and is the most well-established method for assessing the
quality of discrete signals. The PSNR [71] for two discrete signals X and Y is
defined using Mean Squared Error (MSE) as follows:
1
N
N−1
∑
i=0
[X(i)−Y(i)]2 (4.10)
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PSNR is then given as:
PSNR(X,Y) = 20log10(MAXX)− 10log10(MSE) (4.11)
where MAXX is the maximum possible value for X and the units of the PSNR
are in Decibels. Typically, a PSNR of over 30 dB indicates that the signal has
maintained an acceptable quality, though this is highly specific to different types
of media and acceptance levels for quality.
4.3.1.2 Structural Similarity Index
Current research into media quality analysis has yielded various methods of
measuring a media’s quality that are agnostic to the numeric discrepancies of the
media. Despite the wide set of algorithms that exist, the most commonly used and
widely accepted methodology is the Structural Similarity Index [17]. Although this
approach is specific to 2-dimensional signals (for example, images), the approach
may be extrapolated to other dimensions.
We define the Structural SIMilarity Index (SSIM) for two images X and Y as
follows [17]:
SSIM(X,Y) = [l(X,Y)α ∗ c(X,Y)β ∗ s(X,Y)γ] (4.12)
where l(x, y), c(x, y), and s(x, y) are comparison operations, such that l compares
the luminance, c the contrast, and s the structure of the two images. These functions
are defined defined as follows:
l(x, y) =
2µx ∗ µy + C1
µ2x + µ
2
y + C2
(4.13)
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c(x, y) =
2σxσy + C2
σ2x + σ
2
y + C2
(4.14)
s(x, y) =
σxy + C3
σxσy + C3
(4.15)
where µx, σx, and σxy are specified in terms of a media x of size N as follows (note
that x(i) is the media’s intensity at the ith position):
µx =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
x(i) (4.16)
σx = (
1
N − 1 ∗
N
∑
i=1
(x(i)− µx)2) 12 (4.17)
σxy =
1
N − 1
N
∑
i=1
(x(i)− µx)(y(i)− µy) (4.18)
The constants, C1, C2, C3, α, β, and γ are used to fine-tune the SSIM and are
typically defined as C1 << 1, C2 = (K1L)2, C3 =
C2
2 , α = β = γ = 1, where
K1 << 1 and L is the dynamic range of the pixels (0 - 255).
Thus for two 2D media X and Y to be perceptually identical, they must have a
SSIM greater than a threshold τ where the relationship SSIM(X,Y) ≥ τ must be
preserved. Replacing constants, C1, C2, C3, α, β, and γ with the accepted constants
yields the following equation for SSIM:
SSIM(x, y) =
(2µxµy + C1)(2σxy + C2)
(µ2x + µ
2
y + C1)(σ2x + σ2y + C2)
(4.19)
29
4.3.2 Perceptually Identical Media
Using S as a basis, we can formally describe the restrictions for a steganographic
attack which will produce two perceptually identical media. In this manner, the
attack will alter a cover media’s numeric representation while still maintaining an
acceptable media quality that is perceptually identical to the original cover media.
We can therefore state that for a steganographic attack A(X) = Xˆ to maintain
perceptual identity of a media X, the following inequality must be observed:
S(A(X), X) ≥ τ (4.20)
where A(X) = Xˆ is the attacked version of X.
4.3.2.1 Mean Squared Error Perceptually Identical Media
Recall that the PSNR measures the quality between two media X and Y. For two
media X and Y to be perceptually identical, they must have a PSNR greater than
a certain threshold, denoted here as τ. Therefore, the following relationships must
be preserved:
20log10(MAXX)− 10log10( 1N
N−1
∑
i=0
[X(i)−Y(i)]2) ≥ τ (4.21)
Substituting Y for A(X), we find that the following inequality must be pre-
served:
20log10(MAXX)− 10log10( 1N
N−1
∑
i=0
[X(i)− A(X(i))]2) ≥ τ (4.22)
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4.3.2.2 SSIM Perceptually Identical Media
Recall that the SSIM index measures the structural similarity between two media
X and Y. Thus for two media X and Y to be perceptually identical they must
have an SSIM index greater than a certain threshold, denoted here as τ. Thus the
following relationship must be preserved:
(2µxµy + C1)(2σxy + C2)
(µ2x + µ
2
y + C1)(σ2x + σ2y + C2)
≥ τ (4.23)
In general, we can assume that a successful attack will retain the global char-
acteristics of a media. Thus to simplify this derivation we make the assumption
that µx ≈ µy and σx ≈ σy. It follows that the inequality in equation 4.23 can be
rewritten as:
σxy ≥ τσ2x (4.24)
Substituting the equations for σxy and σx defined in equations 4.18 and 4.17
respectively, we find the following inequality must be preserved:
N
∑
i=1
y(i)(x(i) − µx) ≥ τ[(N − 1)
N
∑
i=1
(x(i) − µx)2] 12 +
N
∑
i=1
µx(x(i) − µx) (4.25)
Thus an attacked image y(i) = A(x(i)) must maintain the following inequality
to produce a perceptually identical image:
N
∑
i=1
A(x(i))(x(i)− µx) ≥ τ[(N − 1)
N
∑
i=1
(x(i)− µx)2] 12 +
N
∑
i=1
µx(x(i)− µx) (4.26)
31
The importance of Equation 4.26 is that perceptual identity of a given media
can be directly assessed via easy to compute properties of the image and tuned
via τ.
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Chapter 5
Fundamental DST Attack
Our first implementation of the Discrete Spring Transform was against image
derived media using algorithms which stretch and compresses portions of an
image or video file non-linearly. The concept was derived using existing image
transformation techniques which can quickly and efficiently resize images and
videos according to various parameters. The choice of image and video-derived
media was due to the prevalence and proliferation of image-derived steganography
as well as the wide array of tools that can manipulate image and video-based
media.
5.1 DST for Image-Derived Media
We will now rigorously define the DST for image-derived media. In order to
realize the DST, the digital image is first interpolated into a continuous 2-D image,
which can be expressed as:
Aˆ(x, y) = A(x, y) ∗WL(x, y) (5.1)
where A(x, y) is the M×N original image, and WL is the interpolation window
kernel. In this paper, the 3rd-order Lanczos window kernel of 1-D form can be
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expressed as:
w(x) = 3 ∗ sin(pix)sin(
pix
3 )
pi2x2
, |x| = 0, 0 < |x| < 3, 3 ≤ |x| (5.2)
and the 2-D window kernel is given as:
WL(x, y) = w(x) · w(y) (5.3)
Next, Aˆ(x, y) is re-sampled using variable sampling rates which can be ex-
pressed as:
A′(x, y) = Aˆ(S(x),Q(y)) (5.4)
where S(x) and Q(y) are random curves representing the variable sampling rates.
For example, as shown in Figure 5.1, S(x) maps xi → x′i, which makes the locations
of the re-sampling points from Aˆ(x, y) irregular. It can be shown that if S(x) = x
and Q(y) = y then the re-sampled image A′ will be identical to A. Thus, in
order to make the re-sampled points disordered while keeping A′ the same size
as A, S(x) and Q(y) should be monotonically increasing and the relationship
S(M− 1) ≤ M− 1, Q(N − 1) ≤ N − 1 must be observed.
It follows that this definition of DST can be applied to a variety of domains
and media, not exclusively to image-derived media. In this aspect, the cover
media previously defined as A will take the form of another type of media or
steganographic domain. The definition of DST still holds but is applied in a
different manner to the cover media.
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Figure 5.1: Spring Variable Sampling Rate Curve
5.2 DST Sample Attacks
In order to better illustrate applications of the DST we will describe some concrete
instances of attacks that are simple to conceptualize. The following attacks are
not derived from any existing steganographic attacks but are simply derived DST
attacks that we have conceived to best represent typical DST applications; these
attacks are original techniques specific to DST and as such we have coined several
terms to describe them (pinch, spatial warp, and dimensional). For these examples,
we will focus on image-derived cover media, but as previously stated the cover
media can be diverse.
5.2.1 Pinch Attack
A pinch attack is the simplest example of a DST attack, where the term pinch
derives from the concept of compressing a portion of a cover media, that is,
pinching it. In a pinch attack, a given cover media is transposed into its 2-D
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representation (or possibly as a sequence of 2-D representations) and a given
section of the image is compressed or reduced in size, while the remaining section
of the media is expanded to fill the reduced space. While this attack is extremely
simple it can often prove effective at defeating a variety of steganographic schemes
as the statistics of the image are distorted in a manner that makes preservation of
stego media difficult. The attack directly distorts the image reducing the quality
but depending on the parameters of the pinch these effects can be negligible.
Figure 5.2: Pinch Attack
5.2.2 Spatial Warp Attack
A warp attack is a super-set of the pinch attack and describes any spatial operation
that may be applied to a 2-D representation of cover media, that is, a specific type
of spatial warp or distortion is applied to a cover media. Such attacks can use any
variety of spatial transforms to attack the stego media without severely degrading
the cover-media’s quality.
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5.2.3 Dimensional Attack
A dimensional attack describes skewing or altering a cover media in a given
dimension, hence the name. For example, Spatial Warp attacks and its child
attacks (pinch attack) are considered attacks in 2-D space, where the media is
altered within 2-dimensional space. Depending on how a cover media is defined
it may be susceptible to attacks in multiple dimensions. For example, audio may
often be described using multiple channels, where each channel may be considered
a possible dimension for attack. Similarly, video may be described as a sequence
of 2-dimensional frames, where time may be considered a third dimension for
attack. Attacking a cover media in unconventional domains (such as channels for
audio, or time for video) may produce some excellent active warden attacks, in
that they can be very successful at destroying the stego media while preserving the
cover media’s quality. In the future we hope to further explore unique dimensional
attacks and provide some concrete examples of possible DST for these domains.
5.3 Steganographic Attacks
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the DST attack we have chosen to attack two
different next-generation steganographic algorithms: Motion Vector Steganography
and RST-Resilient Steganography. We have chosen to attack these algorithms as
they both utilize techniques which are considered cutting-edge and robust against
traditional steganographic attacks.
5.3.1 Motion Vector Steganography
The Motion Vector Steganography works by modifying the motion vectors of a
video stream to hide data, where many techniques have been proposed which
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embed information in this domain [32,33,72,73]. The algorithm is effective since
slight alterations to motion vectors are virtually undetectable through traditional
image-based steganographic attacks. The algorithm is robust against compression
or other problems which typically obscure or distort the hidden steganographic
data, making it a prime target for an active warden attack. In fact, currently the
only proposed attack that has been observed in literature is a passive warden
attack which is highly specific to motion vector steganography [74].
5.3.2 RST-Resilient Steganography
As previously described, many types of RST-resilient algorithms exist, however,
we have chosen to focus on an algorithm which encodes data in a normalization
domain, specifically the algorithm described in [75]. This type of RST algorithm is
the most typical example of how RST can be implemented and has been proven
robust against common signal processing attacks and geometric distortions. The
strength of RST algorithms is that they are capable of resisting active stegano-
graphic attacks as opposed to most algorithms which merely attempt to protect
against passive techniques to disrupt data. Thus RST algorithms are prime targets
for active-warden attacks.
5.3.3 Discrete Spring Transform Attack
For Motion Vector and RST resilient algorithms the DST attack is very similar,
the primary difference being that the attack must be applied frame-by-frame to a
video sequence in the case of Motion Vector steganography. In the case of Motion
Vector steganography, the attack is implemented by first encoding a video stream
with the Motion Vector steganographic algorithm described in [32]. The DST is
then applied to each frame of the video. For this specific attack, we arbitrarily
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chose to implement a pinch transform of each frame, where a certain section of the
frame is squeezed, and the remaining section of the frame is stretched. The size
and compression ratio of the pinch attack is swept against various values, where
the size of the pinch selection and compression ratio dictate how much of frame is
pinched, and how much this collection is compressed respectively.
The resulting frame is slightly distorted but retains the properties of the original
frame, such as the size. A ’pinch’ is used simply because it is easy to implement
and apply to individual frames of a video, however, any number of DST algorithms
could be applied. This ’pinch’ will clearly distort the frame, and in fact is the
reason that the hidden message will be destroyed. Despite this, the transform is
essentially invisible to the naked eye and does not significantly distort the video,
which will be verified by comparing the PSNR before and after the transform.
After the DST is applied the resultant video is decoded and the BER is determined
for the extracted message. For the RST-Resilient attack an image was first encoded
using the algorithm described in [75]. The image was then attacked using a pinch
transform, which was identical to the pinch used to attack each frame of the
Motion Vector algorithm. The image was then decoded and the BER and PSNR
were determined in the same manner as the Motion Vector attack.
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Chapter 6
Multi-Dimensional DST Attack
The second iteration of the DST attack exploited the fact that multiple dimensions
of a media can be attacked simultaneously. For example, certain steganographic
algorithms may encode information within a spatial domain, whereas other media
may encode information within the time domain. Attacking multiple dimensions
simultaneously makes the DST more powerful since it can likewise attack different
types of steganographic algorithms simultaneously.
6.1 Video Steganography
While video steganography is a relatively new steganographic medium, there have
been some interesting schemes proposed which encode information in multiple
domains of video sequences. Most of these techniques fall into one of three cate-
gories: 2-dimensional encoding, 3-dimensional encoding, and multi-dimensional
encoding.
6.1.1 2-Dimensional Video Steganography
2-Dimensional video steganography refers to any techniques which may be used
to encode information within individual frames of a video sequence using image-
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based steganography where example algorithms may be found in [76–78]. Since
these techniques only operate 2-dimensionally within individual frames of the
video sequence, the term 2-dimensional steganography is appropriate. There is
nothing gained over normal image-based steganography using these techniques as
the strength of the algorithms are not enhanced when applied to video.
6.1.2 3-Dimensional Video Steganography
3-dimensional video steganography refers to techniques which attempt to encode
information using a third dimension of the video sequence, such as time or motion
vectors.
With time-based steganography, information may be spread in time by altering
only certain frames, or sections of frames within a video sequence using image-
based steganography. The advantage to this approach is that only a fraction of
the possible frames and data are encoded, making steganographic attacks difficult
since most of the video sequence will not contain any steganographic data. As a
result, many steganographic attacks that take advantage of predefined statistics
within image or video sequences would likely fail since the encoded video largely
retains the same metrics as the original sequence.
Motion vector steganography encodes information within the motion vectors of
a video sequence typically by intercepting the motion estimation block (as found
in popular video compression algorithms) and altering motion vectors in a certain
way [32,33,72,73]. This technique utilizes motion between frames which is also
considered a 3-dimensional medium for encoding. This attack is unique in that
it takes advantage of a video-specific medium to encode information, meaning
that image-based steganographic attacks are inadequate to defeat this type of
steganography. Currently, the only observed attacks in literature are passive
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warden attacks that are specific to motion vector steganography [79,80].
6.1.3 Multi-Dimensional Video Steganography
Multi-dimensional video steganography refers to a combination of 2-Dimensional
and 3-Dimensional video steganography. Multi-dimensional steganography can
simultaneously encode information in both the 3D and 2D sections of video,
resulting in an extremely large capacity for steganographic data. In fact, often both
techniques can be encoded independently of each other, meaning it is possible
to encode two different sequences of information in two different domains of the
video simultaneously. Figure 6.1 shows a block diagram of how 2D and 3D video
steganography can both be applied to a video sequence. In this sample scheme,
each frame of the video is encoded using standard image-based steganography
(this frame is called the IFrame). Next, the next frame in the sequence (called the
PFrame) is used to perform motion estimation from the IFrame. The PFrame is
altered using motion-vector steganography to encode information. The cycle is
then repeated by advancing the sequence using the PFrame as the new IFrame.
The result of this type of encoding is that there is no current steganographic attack
that can simultaneously address the 2D and 3D encoding in the video sequence.
For this reason, we have chosen to attack multi-dimensional video steganography
using the multi-dimensional DST to show how this attack can simultaneously
defeat two different types of steganography schemes.
6.2 System Architecture and Methodology
We will now formally describe the Discrete Spring Transform for video steganogra-
phy and some sample applications for specific types of cover media. The definition
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Figure 6.1: Video Steganography Encoding
of the Discrete Spring Transform is independent of any specific steganographic
algorithm and can be applied to any type of cover media in n-dimensional space.
6.2.1 Discrete Spring Transform
Let C be an n-dimensional cover media defined as:
C = F(x, y, z, . . .) (6.1)
where
x, y, z, . . . ∈ Z (6.2)
and the number of parameters in F(x, y, z, ...) is n.
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The Discrete Spring Transform for a cover media C and attacked cover media
Cˆ may be described as follows:
C = F(x, y, z, . . .)→ AF(baxc , bbyc , bczc , . . .) = Cˆ (6.3)
and A, a, b, c, . . . ≈ 1 and are defined as:
A = f1(x, y, z, . . .)
a = f2(x, y, z, . . .)
b = f3(x, y, z, . . .)
c = f4(x, y, z, . . .)
. . . = fn(x, y, z, . . .)
(6.4)
The strength of the Discrete Spring Transform lies in the definition of fn(x, y, z, . . .),
which we define as any non-linear and time-variant function. Unlike simple RST
transforms, the non-linearity of the DST is applied to each dimension of the image.
6.2.2 DST for Image Media
Define an M x N pixel gray-scale image I as a cover media I = F(x, y), where the
number of pixels in x is M, and the number of pixels in y is N.
The DST is then realized as:
I = F(x, y)→ AF(baxc , bbyc) = Iˆ (6.5)
where A, a, b are defined as:
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A = f1(x, y)
a = f2(x, y)
b = f3(x, y)
(6.6)
and fn(x, y) is any non-linear time-variant function.
6.2.3 DST for Video Media
Define an M x N x F video (consisting of a sequence of F M x N gray-scale images)
as a cover media V = F(x, y, z), where the number of pixels in x is M, the number
of pixels in y is N, and the number of frames is F.
The DST is then realized as:
V = F(x, y, z)→ AF(baxc , bbyc , bczc) = Vˆ (6.7)
where A, a, b, c are defined as:
A = f1(x, y, z)
a = f2(x, y, z)
b = f3(x, y, z)
c = f4(x, y, z)
(6.8)
and fn(x, y, z) is any non-linear time-variant function.
6.3 Video Steganography Attack
As other steganographers have observed, video steganography is fast becoming an
interesting new steganographic medium which has enormous capacity compared
with traditional steganographic cover mediums [32,33,72,73,76]. For this reason,
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we have chosen to apply the multi-dimensional DST attack to video steganogra-
phy. We have chosen to attack a scheme which encodes information in multiple
steganographic domains of the video sequence, using image-based steganography
and motion-vector steganography. Figure 6.1 describes the process of encoding
information in the video sequence where information is encoded 2-dimensionally
within individual frames of the video, as well as 3-dimensionally within the motion
vectors of the video. We believe this scheme represents a robust system that would
be exceptionally difficult to combat using existing steganographic attacks.
The attack will utilize 2D and Time (3D) DST attacks to combat the multi-
dimensional video steganography scheme. Figure 6.2 describes the process of
attacking the video sequence as follows: First, the video sequence is decomposed
into a train of 2D images or frames. Next each frame of the sequence is attacked
using the 2D DST transform. Lastly, this resultant sequence is attacked using the
Time (3D) DST attack. The semantics of the 2D and Time (3D) DST attacks are
described in the following sections.
6.3.1 2D DST Attack
The 2-dimensional DST attack has been previously described in [1], where the
attack was applied to individual frames of a video sequence. The 2D DST attack
can more generally be defined as an operation which will spatially distort media
that can be expressed 2-dimensionally using a nonlinear spatial transform. Various
algorithms may be applied which fit the criteria of a 2D DST attack, however,
for simplicity we will focus on attacking the media using a ’pinch’ attack, where
individual sections of two-dimensional media are stretched and other sections are
compressed. The net effect of this nonlinear spatial attack is that the media retains
some slight distortion but the attack is effective in destroying most hidden stegano-
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Figure 6.2: DST Video Steganography Attack
graphic data while maintaining an acceptable PSNR. This attack has been proven
to be effective at combating complicated cover media such as video sequences, and
will be part of the multi-dimensional Spring attack.
6.3.2 DST Time Attack
The DST Time attack is in principle identical to the 2D DST attack but is im-
plemented in the third dimension of the steganographic media rather than the
second dimension. It is understood that this attack can only be applied to those
types of cover-media which exhibit at least three dimensions, such as video se-
quences. For a video sequence, this attack can be thought of as affecting the time
or framerate, hence the title DST Time attack. Figure 6.3 describes the process of a
simple DST Time attack, where a video sequence is first arbitrarily split into two
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video sequences. Next, each of these sequences is stretched or compressed via
3-dimensional interpolation in the time dimension. The result is that the number
of frames in one sequence is decreased while the number of frames in the other
sequence is increased. The resulting sequences are then combined to form a video
sequence that has the same number of frames as the original sequence. This attack
will be applied as part of the multi-dimensional Spring attack.
Figure 6.3: DST Time Attack
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Chapter 7
Domain-based DST Attack
In the same way that steganographers realized there are advantages to encoding
information within alternative domain representations of a media, the next evo-
lution of the DST attack was that the attack could be applied to an alternative
domain as well. Attacking alternative domains of a media, such as the frequency
domain, distributes the attack more evenly, which improves efficiency and quality
by distributing the distortions across the media instead of localizing them to certain
spatial regions.
7.1 System Architecture and Methodology
We now formally describe the Frequency DST (FDST) attack for image-derived
cover media, using the Fourier Transform as the reference frequency domain. The
FDST can be applied to other types of cover media and frequency domains as
well, however, we restrict the definition to images using the Fourier transform for
simplicity.
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7.1.1 Frequency-based DST for Image-derived media
Let C = c(x, y) be an M x N pixel gray scale image, where the number of pixels in
x is M and the number of pixels in y is N.
We define the 2D Fourier transform of C, Cˆ as:
Cˆ = F(C)→ F(w1,w2) =
M−1
∑
i=0
N−1
∑
j=0
c(i, j)e−i2pi(
w1i
M +
w2 j
N ) (7.1)
We next select the mid-range frequency components of Cˆ, MCˆ using parameters
γ1,γ2, δ1, δ2 as follows:
MCˆ = {F(w1,w2) | γ1 < w1 < γ2, δ1 < w2 < δ2} (7.2)
We select the mid-range frequency components as most steganographic schemes
encode information here to avoid distorting the cover media, and likewise we also
wish to avoid distorting the cover media too severely. Note however that the choice
of γ and δ is left to the attacker and may be chosen however is most appropriate.
MCˆ must next be partitioned into a set of blocks B(w1,w2) with a randomly
selected block size. The selection of these blocks is randomized to attempt to attack
the encoded information with as much irregularity as possible. In other words,
most steganographic schemes employ some method of error correction, which
assumes that errors are applied with some uniformity. The randomized selection
of these blocks attempts to defeat such correction techniques by introducing as
much non-linearity as possible.
Define PMCˆ as the set of all blocks B in MCˆ as follows:
PMCˆ = {B(w1,w2) | B ∈ MCˆ} (7.3)
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The partitioning of Cˆ is used to account for possible irregularities in the selection
of MC. For each block B ∈ PMCˆ we perform the 2D DST transform [1] to find the
DST attacked block B¯ as:
B¯ = DST2D(B) = A ∗ B(baw1c, bbw2c) (7.4)
where A, a, b are randomized non-linear time-variant functions.
Once the 2D DST attacked blocks are found the image is reconstructed using
these attacked blocks to obtain the FDST attacked image, inverting steps (such as
the Fourier transform) where necessary.
7.1.2 Frequency-based DST Algorithm
The FDST is easily described algorithmically, where figure 7.1 demonstrates the
algorithm in pseudo code (note that FFT and IFFT refer to Fast Fourier Transform
and Inverse Fast Fourier Transform respectively).
1: procedure Frequency DST(C,γ, δ)
2: Cˆ ← FFT(C)
3: MCˆ ← mid(Cˆ,γ, δ)
4: PMCˆ ← {B | B ∈ rand partition(MCˆ)}
5: for all B ∈ PMCˆ do
6: Bˆ← DST(B)
7: end for
8: return IFFT(Cˆ)
9: end procedure
Figure 7.1: Frequency DST Algorithm
Where figure 7.2 shows how the frequency domain of a cover media is masked
to find the mid-range frequency components and figure 7.3 shows how the mid-
range frequency band is partitioned into sub-blocks for the attack.
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1: procedure mid(Cˆ,γ, δ)
2: m← {}
3: for all c(w1,w2) ∈ Cˆ do
4: if (γ1 < w1 < γ2) & (δ1 < w2 < δ2) then
5: m← m ∪ c(w1,w2)
6: end if
7: end for
8: return m
9: end procedure
Figure 7.2: Mid-Range Frequency Component Selection
1: procedure rand partition(MCˆ)
2: B← {}
3: x ← 0
4: y← 0
5: while x < w1 do
6: while y < w2 do
7: x ← x+ rand()
8: y← y+ rand()
9: b← MCˆ(x, y)
10: if b ∈ MCˆ then
11: B← B ∪ b
12: end if
13: end while
14: end while
15: return B
16: end procedure
Figure 7.3: Random Partitioning Algorithm
7.2 Frequency Domain Discrete Spring Transform Attack
For the Frequency DST attack (FDST) we concentrated our efforts on the Fourier
transform of the cover media, however, most frequency domain transforms could
be interchanged (for example Discrete Cosine Transform) since they are so similar.
The main revisions of the FDST from a traditional DST attack involve determining
where the attack is more effectively concentrated in the frequency domain. As
previously stated, the mid-range components of the FFT are typically least affected
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by distortion, in fact, this is where most steganographic schemes embed informa-
tion. With this premise we choose to attack the mid-range frequency components
of the FFT cover media. As the DST is more easily implemented by attacking
square or rectangular regions (since it typically requires interpolation), it is simpler
to partition the mid-range frequency components into randomized rectangular
sub-sections. This is done by masking off the mid-range components of the cover
media and partitioning them into arbitrary sized rectangular regions. After this
is accomplished, the DST is applied normally to each rectangular region using
a ’pinch’ transform as described in [1]. The pinch parameters for each DST are
randomized to provide maximum disruption of cover media and apply a more
uniform distortion to the DST. The FFT cover media is then reassembled using the
attacked regions and transformed back to the spatial domain.
Figure 7.4: FDST Attack Diagram
As evident, there are many portions of the algorithm used within this attack
where the parameters can be tuned for either strength or quality of the cover media.
The most obvious choices are the size and position of the mid-range frequency
components and the size of the rectangular partitions.
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Chapter 8
Multi-Vector DST Attack
A significant improvement to other DST implementations is the development of a
generalized DST framework to attack a media using multiple simultaneous attack
vectors while maintaining the media’s perceptual identity. Attacking a media with
multiple simultaneous vectors drastically improves the performance of an attack
since the attack can be targeted against a variety of steganographic algorithms that
may encode data in different vectors of a media.
8.1 Perceptually Faithful Only DST
The basis of the Multi-Vector DST (MV-DST) attack is the realization that two
images may maintain perceptual identity without maintaining numerical iden-
tity. As previously described, steganography can be considered a form of covert
communication where the stego-media is a carrier or channel for hidden informa-
tion. In order to maintain communication using steganography, the channel or
stego-media must maintain a certain Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) to be properly
received.
Utilizing our definitions of performance and perceptual identity from 4.2.3
and 4.3.1 respectively, an algorithm which maintains perceptual identity while
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Figure 8.1: PFO DST Attack Diagram
maximizing attack performance is defined in figure 8.1.
Direct implementation of this algorithm is impractical as it requires being
able to compute the performance of the attack, which will not be known to an
attacker. However, this algorithm is very useful when combined with estimations
of performance in terms of other known DST properties. This relationship will be
elaborated in the formal MV-DST methodology.
8.2 MV-DST Framework
Previous implementations of the Discrete Spring Transform were implemented
as a singular attack vector [1–5], where a specific domain of a cover media is
disrupted in a specific manner. For instance, several DST implementations displace
vectors using interpolation-based techniques within spatial or frequency domains
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[1, 2, 4]. These DST implementations in essence implement the attack in a very
specific, singular vector, meaning the directionality of the approach is fixed. A
DST implementation which can be applied in multiple simultaneous vectors of
any domain would be highly advantageous for an attacker to achieve maximal
adaptability and flexibility in how the disruption is applied. Furthermore, a
formally-defined DST would allow an attacker to more succinctly describe and
tune the characteristics of the disruption.
8.2.1 Multi-Vector Directional Discrete Spring Transform Attack
Let C be a digital cover media with N dimensions and discrete intensity levels
ranging from 0 to α where each value in C takes the form of c(x1, x2, . . . , xn).
To perform the Multi-Vector Discrete Spring Transform attack we first define a
Spring Mesh Φ as follows:
Φ(X) = Φ(x1, x2, ..., xn) = (x1 + φ1, x2 + φ2, ..., xn + φn) (8.1)
where φx is a random value such that −12 < φx < 12 and the size of Φ is 2N.
The details of selecting an appropriate Φ are up to the attacker and constraints
and considerations for selection of Φ are further discussed in 8.2.3.
Now, Φ is used to determine the continuous Spring Mesh mapping G of the
media C as follows:
G =

g(0) = c(0)
g(σx1(x1, x2, . . . , xn), σx2(x1, x2, . . . , xn), . . . , σxn(x1, x2, . . . , xn)) =
c(x1, x2, . . . , xn)(1+ 2Φn+1(x1, x2, . . . , xn))
(8.2)
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where
σγ(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = γ+
∫
[0,γ]
Φ(x1, x2, . . . , xn)dµ(γ) (8.3)
In this manner, the Spring Mesh mapping G contains values of C that have
been displaced and scaled from their original position and intensity.
Since G is continuous, the position of values within G do not necessarily
coincide with the original discrete positions in C. In order to translate G back to
the original discrete domain of the media C, an inverse function G−1 (referred to
as the Spring normalization function) is required which is defined as follows:
G−1 = g−1(x1, x2, . . . , xn) =
x1+β
∑
X1=x1−β
x2+β
∑
X2=x2−β
. . .
xn+β
∑
Xn=xn−β
g(X1, X2, . . . , Xn)
‖< X1, X2, . . . , Xn > − < x1, x1, . . . , xn >‖
(8.4)
where x1, x2, . . . , xn ∈ C. G−1 is essentially just the weighted average of points
within a block of β in the Spring Mesh mapping G. The points are weighted using
the squared Euclidean distance between the target point and points found within
G. The choice of β is again up to the attacker and a discussion of impacts for the
choice of β is further discussed in 8.2.3.
The result of G−1(G) is the MV-DST attacked media.
8.2.2 Attack Properties and Characteristics
The Discrete Spring Transform is comprised of several important properties: conti-
nuity, elasticity, and reactivity. These properties directly impact the quality of the
cover media and the performance of any steganographic carriers within the media.
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8.2.2.1 Continuity
The continuity of the MV-DST refers to how smooth, or continuous, changes in
the resultant DST-encoded media are. Consider that a media which exhibits sharp,
rigid, or discontinuous areas would likely result in a media with low perceptual
quality.
The continuity of the Γth dimension of DST-encoded media ∆Γ is defined in
terms of the Spring Mesh Φ as follows:
∆Γ =
‖Γ‖
∑
γ=1
|Φ(γ)−Φ(γ− 1)|
2 ‖ Γ ‖ (8.5)
The smoother Φ is, the greater ∆ is and the more continuous the DST-encoded
media will be. When considering that media components are directly displaced by
Φ, the smoother Φ is the less rigid or discontinuous the DST-encoded media will
be.
8.2.2.2 Elasticity
The elasticity of the MV-DST is a measure of how alterations to a particular
section of a media impact other neighboring regions of the media. The basis of
the DST is that of altering a media in a manner that introduces highly-localized
distortions that impact neighboring regions proportionately. Consider that if a
particular section of a media is enlarged or stretched, neighboring regions are
shrunk or scaled to maintain the size and average characteristics of that section.
This produces an encoded media that is not simply an affine or scaling operation,
but one that is non-linear and maintains global characteristics of a media. In fact,
elasticity is one of the most important characteristics of the DST.
The elasticity of the DST is directly impacted by the choice of β when perform-
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ing the inverse Spring Mesh mapping. As β approaches the size of the cover media,
each point within the Spring Mesh mapped media G impacts each resultant point
in the MV-DST-encoded image. Conversely, a small β will produce a media where
alterations to particular regions may have little to no effect on neighboring regions.
As a result, the elasticity e is proportional to β and is defined as:
e =
β
‖ Φ ‖ (8.6)
where β ≥ 1.
8.2.2.3 Reactivity
Reactivity refers to how strongly components of the DST-encoded media are
displaced or scaled. A reactivity score of 0 would indicate that the DST-encoded
media is identical to the original, or in other words, was not attacked. The reactivity
of the γth dimension of φ, ργ, is defined as follows:
ρΓ =
‖Γ‖
∑
γ=0
|Φ(γ)|
2 ‖ Γ ‖ (8.7)
We define the reactivity in terms of each dimension of the Spring Mesh since it
is not obvious how to compare the reactivity for intensity versus position values.
It is also likely that the attacker may choose to have a different reactivity score for
positional versus intensity values, and the computation of ργ allows individual
tuning of media reactivity.
8.2.3 Attack Considerations
An attacker whom carefully considers the effect a given Spring Mesh Φ will have
on continuity, elasticity, and reactivity will produce a more optimal attack than
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a naive attacker. Recall from [1] that the goal of the DST attack is to introduce
highly localized, non-linear variations to the media. An attacker that maximizes
continuity, elasticity, and reactivity while observing an appropriate perceptual
quality will maintain these important DST characteristics without disturbing the
quality of the media.
Since Φ is simple to construct and the continuity, elasticity, and reactivity are
simple to observe and compute, tuning Φ is a relatively straightforward process.
In general, there are no strict limitations placed on the selection of Φ, but the
following relationships are suggested from observed results:
• ∑ φ ≈ 0
• 2 ≤ β ≤ Γ4
The summation of φ (which is distinct from the reactivity), should be approx-
imately equal to 0 in order to preserve, as closely as possible, the original scale
of the media. Likewise, the selection of β has been shown to be most effective
when it is not too small or large, where observed values of 2 and Γ4 make effective
lower and upper limits. Attackers may choose to tune or alter φ as appropriate for
the attack at hand. Likewise, φ may also vary significantly if an alternate attack
domain, such as the frequency domain, is used as the target domain.
Most steps of the MV-DST are computationally simple to perform, however, the
normalization phase can be very computationally intensive, since it must search the
Spring-Mesh g for indices that are at a distance of β. The computational complexity
of the normalization process can be substantially improved if the indices in g are
quantized or rounded to fixed positions. This quantization process essentially
eliminates the search that needs to be performed since the indices can be arranged
after they are quantized. Although the quantization process reduces the accuracy
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Figure 8.2: Original Function and Φ
of the normalization process, the increased computational performance is often
worth this decrease in accuracy. Likewise, the attacker can choose between the
complexity and accuracy of the normalization process to suit their needs.
8.2.4 A Concrete Example
8.2.4.1 1-Dimensional Example
Consider a 1-dimensional function f (x) as depicted in figure 8.2a and a corre-
sponding Spring-Mesh Φ as depicted in figures 8.2b and 8.2c.
Φ displaces positional indices and scales amplitudinal values as described in
8.2. Since f (x) is two-dimensional, the x indices of the function f (x) are scaled by
ΦΓ. Consider the third position of f (x), where x = 2 and z = 0. The Spring-Mesh
mapped index for g(x) is equal to σx(x) = x+∑20Φ(x, 1) = 2+ 0.3255 = 2.3255
and the amplitudinal value is g(2.3255) = f (2) ∗ (1+Φ(2, 2)) = 6 ∗ (1+ 0.0174) =
6.1044. The operation is repeated for each value in f (x) forming the Spring-Mesh
mapping g(x) as depicted in 8.3a.
After the Spring Mesh mapping is found, it needs to be normalized to adhere
to the dimensions and discrete points of the original function f (x). As described in
8.4, each discrete point in f (x) is iterated and the normalized value is calculated by
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Figure 8.3: Spring Mesh and Normalization Comparison
computing the weighted average of points within β. The metric used for weighting
the points found within β is the squared Euclidean distance. For example, consider
the second discrete point in f (x), where x = 1. If we let β = 2, then we find 3 points
in g(x) where x = 1, 2.1286, 3.3255 and g(x) = 1.1, 4.3064, 6.1042 respectively. We
next compute the weighted average of these points using the squared Euclidean
distance as the metric as follows:
f (1) =
g(1.1)
<1.1,1> +
g(2.1286)
<2.1286,1> +
g(3.3255)
<3.3255,1>
< 1.1, 1 > + < 2.1286, 1 > + < 3.3255, 1 >
=
1.1
0.01 +
4.306
1.274 +
6.104
5.41
0.01+ 1.274+ 5.41
8.2.4.2 Image Example
To further demonstrate how the MV-DST may be applied to a more complex
function, a gray-scale image (which is essentially a 2-dimensional discrete function),
is attacked using the MV-DST. Figure 8.4 demonstrates the results of performing
the MV-DST against a gray-scale image, where figure 8.4a shows the original
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(a) Original Image (b) Φ Γ (c) MV-DST Image
Figure 8.4: MV-DST Image Example
image, figure 8.4b the Spring Mesh Φ, and figure 8.4c the result of the MV-DST.
In this scenario, the reactivity ρ of the Spring Mesh is exceptionally high for
demonstration purposes. For the purpose of defeating steganography within a
cover media, the reactivity would likely be much lower to maintain appropriate
perceptual quality.
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Chapter 9
Results
As evident, the Discrete Spring Transform has been used in numerous applications
to defeat a wide array of steganographic algorithms in a wide array of cover media.
I will now describe simulation results we’ve obtained when applying the DST to
various types of steganographic algorithms.
9.1 Fundamental DST Attack
To demonstrate the Fundamental DST attack, a video steam consisting of 100
frames was encoded with a random bit string using the Motion vector stegano-
graphic algorithm in [32], where the algorithm alters motion vectors within the
video stream to hide the message. Likewise an image was encoded in a similar
manner using the RST-Resilient steganographic algorithm in [81]. A pinch trans-
form was then applied to each frame of the video (or image, in the case of the
RST algorithm), where the size of the pinch was swept from from 0 to 100 pixels.
We have dubbed the size of the pinch the width, which is the size of the image
(measured in pixels) that will be attacked. Next, several different compression
ratios were chosen for the attack, ranging from 0.65-0.95, where the compression
ratio is the percentage of the pinch that was compressed, that is, the compression
64
Attack Strength (Pixels)
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
B
E
R
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Motion Vector Attack - BER Simulation Results
0.95 Compression Ratio
0.91 Compression Ratio
0.87 Compression Ratio
0.83 Compression Ratio
(a) BER vs Pinch Width
Attack Strength (Pixels)
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
P
S
N
R
(d
B
)
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
Motion Vector Attack - PSNR Simulation Results
0.95 Compression Ratio
0.91 Compression Ratio
0.87 Compression Ratio
0.83 Compression Ratio
(b) PSNR vs Pinch Width
Figure 9.1: Motion Vector Attack
ratio is defined as the size of the resultant pinch versus the original pinch. Thus
a compression ratio of 0.95 indicates that the original pinch is compressed to
0.95 of its original size. It follows that the larger the pinch, and the lower the
compression ratio the greater the strength of the attack. Since the attack relies only
on some basic 2-dimensional (or possibly 3-dimensional in the case of RGB image)
spatial transforms via interpolation of matrices we observe that the attack has the
potential to be implemented efficiently on a variety of platforms. At a pinch width
of 0 pixels the DST encoded frame was identical to the original frame or image,
meaning the PSNR was infinite and the BER was identical to that of the original
encoded image. Figures 9.1 and 9.2 demonstrate how the BER and PSNR of the
encoded messages changes with the pinch width.
It is easily observable through figures 9.1a and 9.2a that the BER of the encoded
message increases dramatically to values between 0.3 and 0.5 when the DST is
applied, indicating that the DST is successful in destroying the hidden data within
the video stream. It is also observable through figures 9.1b and 9.2b that the
quality of the DST attacked cover media is acceptable for all simulated Spring
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Figure 9.2: RST Attack
transform widths, where the PSNR is approximately 30dB or more. As a result, we
can conclude that this simulation proves the Fundamental DST attack is successful
in attacking the motion vector and RST-Resilient algorithms.
9.2 Multi-dimensional DST Attack
The next simulation uses the multi-dimensional DST implementation to attack 2D
and 3D video steganography schemes. The simulation demonstrates how the DST
may be applied in different attack vectors to attempt to disrupt steganographic
schemes that may be implemented in multiple dimensions. The algorithm used
for the simulation is a direct implementation of the scheme proposed in figure 6.1,
where each frame is encoded using image-based steganography from [26] and the
video’s motion is encoded using motion vector steganography from [32].
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9.2.1 2D Video DST Attack
Table 9.1 shows the BER for the 2D steganographic scheme under the multi-
dimensional DST attack. As evident, the BER of the 2D steganographic scheme
was increased dramatically with the 2D and Time DST attack. The table indicates
that the 2D DST attack was much more successful in destroying the steganographic
media than was the Time DST attack, however, even for a modest 2D DST attack
the BER increases to approximately 0.5 which is shown in highlight.
2D Chop (pixels)
0 10 20 30 40 50
Ti
m
e
C
ho
p
(f
ra
m
es
)
0 0.0003 0.1020 0.5351 0.5195 0.5185 0.4611
5 0.0006 0.1033 0.5364 0.5214 0.5077 0.4531
10 0.0010 0.1043 0.5418 0.5236 0.5086 0.4557
15 0.0010 0.1052 0.5402 0.5293 0.5140 0.4534
20 0.0010 0.1043 0.5450 0.5332 0.5057 0.4544
25 0.0013 0.1087 0.5421 0.5360 0.5061 0.4585
Table 9.1: 2D Steganography BER
9.2.2 Time (3D) DST BER
Next, the 3D DST Table 9.2 shows the BER for the motion vector scheme under the
multi-dimensional DST attack. It can be seen that the BER of the 3D steganographic
scheme was increased significantly under either the 2D or Time DST attack. Unlike
the 2D steganographic scheme, both the 2D and Time DST attacks were equally
successful in combating the motion vector steganography, as evidenced by the fact
both schemes successfully increase the BER to 0.5 dB.
9.2.3 Cover Media Quality
Table 9.3 shows the PSNR for the video sequence under the multi-dimensional
DST attack. The results indicate that the PSNR was acceptable for all tested DST
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2D Chop (pixels)
0 10 20 30 40 50
Ti
m
e
C
ho
p
(f
ra
m
es
)
0 0.0000 0.0000 0.3891 0.4713 0.5161 0.5146
5 0.5197 0.5257 0.5106 0.5338 0.4970 0.5015
10 0.5423 0.5302 0.5474 0.4945 0.5121 0.5287
15 0.4990 0.5318 0.5484 0.5378 0.5484 0.5237
20 0.5302 0.5635 0.5181 0.5297 0.5297 0.5156
25 0.5514 0.5559 0.5413 0.5398 0.4950 0.5186
Table 9.2: Motion Vector Steganography BER
transforms, where the PSNR always remains close to 30dB. The optimal transform
widths for these schemes were indicated by the shaded cell in each of the three
tables, where the 2D DST Chop was 20 pixels and the Time (3D) DST Chop was 10
frames.
2D Chop (pixels)
0 10 20 30 40 50
Ti
m
e
C
ho
p
(f
ra
m
es
)
0 ∞ 30.887 29.686 29.339 29.144 29.018
5 34.250 30.136 29.377 29.137 28.994 28.898
10 32.238 29.765 29.223 29.036 28.913 28.828
15 31.470 29.594 29.141 28.979 28.868 28.792
20 31.090 29.496 29.092 28.943 28.838 28.769
25 30.864 29.435 29.059 28.919 28.817 28.752
Table 9.3: Motion Vector Steganography PSNR (db)
9.3 Domain-based DST Attack
Next, we simulated the domain-based DST implementation by attacking the
frequency domain of an image encoded using image-based steganography, which
we call the Frequency Discrete Spring Transform (FDST) attack. We encoded a
multitude of images using a simple spread-spectrum steganographic technique [26]
where the images were selected from the USC SIPI [82], and Kodak lossless image
suite databases [83]. The spread-spectrum technique encodes information within
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the mid-range frequency components of the frequency domain of the cover media,
and is a typical example of frequency domain steganography. The important
parameters for this attack are related to the selection and partitioning of the
mid-range frequency components. For this implementation, we chose to sweep
the attack against the percentage of the attacked versus non-attacked frequency
components of the image’s frequency domain representation, which we refer
to as the attack strength. This is to avoid severely distorting the image while
also utilizing the knowledge that most steganographic schemes which encode
information in the frequency domain utilize the mid-range frequency components.
Our simulation results indicate that increasing the size of the mid-range selec-
tion increases the BER of the encoded information while decreasing the PSNR of
the image. Fig 9.3a demonstrates the BER of the 512 by 512 pixel images under
FDST attack. The figure demonstrates that the DST is effective in destroying the
hidden stego-data of the cover media, as the BER increases steadily to 0.5 with
sufficient attack strength.
In order for the attack against the 512 by 512 pixel images to be considered
successful, the image must maintain an acceptable quality, where a PSNR of 30dB
is typically considered acceptable. Fig 9.3b shows the PSNR of the images under
attack. Although the quality drops according to the attack strength, the figure
indicates that the images maintain an acceptable quality and proves the attack is
not too damaging.
To further strengthen these results, we performed the attack against another
set of test images of size 768 by 512 pixels. Again, the results indicate the attack
was successful at removing the stego-data from the cover media.
Fig 9.4a shows the BER for the set of 768 by 512 pixel images under FDST
attack. The BER increases dramatically at approximately 30% attack strength to
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Figure 9.3: 512x512 Image Attack
approximately 0.5, indicating that the stego-data is completely destroyed within
the cover media.
The quality of the 768 by 512 pixel images was also assessed in order to prove
that the attack was not too damaging to the images. As seen in figure 9.4b, the
images maintain a strong PSNR of approximately 30dB, which means that the
quality is preserved for the attack.
It follows that the FDST attack is effective at destroying the steganographic
information within all of the attacked images. We found that certain images were
more affected by the attack than others, for example, the images Girl and Buildings
both produced a much worse PSNR than the average PSNR of the other images.
The properties of these images are such that they were more severely affected by
distortions in the mid-range frequency components than the other test images,
likely due to the fact that there are a lot of smaller details within these images
that would make them more susceptible to frequency domain distortion than
others. However, despite this fact, the BER for these two images remained static as
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Figure 9.4: 768x512 Image Attack
compared with the average BER, which means an attacker could simply choose
the PSNR they would like to maintain in order to maximize the BER of the image.
It is important to note that a steganographer would also face similar difficulties
for images which are more susceptible to mid-range frequency distortion as they
would not be able to encode stego-data as strongly.
9.4 Multi-Vector DST Attack
Our Multi-Vector DST attack was broken into two distinct sub-attacks to demon-
strate important implementations. Firstly, an entirely PFO-based attack was imple-
mented in order to demonstrate how to maximize the effectiveness of the attack.
This PFO attack operates on a feedback loop to maximize the performance and
quality of the attacked media. Using the results of this attack, one can begin to
select good approximations of various components of the MV-DST attack and
generalize how properties such as reactivity, elasticity, and continuity correlate to
performance and quality of attacked media. Using this as a basis, the MV-DST
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can be implemented to attack multiple simultaneous vectors within a cover media
using approximations found in the PFO-based attack.
9.4.1 Perceptually Faithful Only Attack
The PFO DST attack was implemented against a collection of images from the
USCI [82] image database. Although the attack may easily be extrapolated to
other media types, images were chosen due to the plethora and diverse set of
image-based steganographic techniques.
Three distinct steganographic algorithms were used to encode data within this
image set which use Spread-Spectrum (SS), Single Value Decomposition (SVD), and
Rotation Scaling Translation-resilient (RST) embedding techniques. The SS-based
technique is a very typical type of image steganography, and the algorithm used for
this attack [84] embeds spreading sequences in the DCT domain of an image. The
SVD-based technique is more sophisticated than the SS-based technique and uses
the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) to embed components in the HH block of
the image’s DWT domain. The specific algorithm used for the SVD implementation
is described in [85]. Lastly, the RST-based technique uses normalization domains
to embed components in a domain which is guaranteed to remain static under
RST attacks. RST methods represent some of the most sophisticated embedding
techniques, and are some of the only techniques which have been proven to actively
resist active steganographic attacks. The algorithm used for this RST embedding
technique is based on a normalization-based technique described in [81].
The goal of this attack was to match a set of performance and quality metrics
as closely as possible. In a typical attack scenario, an attacker would attempt to
maximize the errors in the steganographic data, while minimizing the damage done
to the media. The purpose of matching target performance and quality metrics
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(rather than maximizing performance and quality) is to show the adaptability of
the PFO DST attack and how it can be easily tuned to fit specific attack parameters.
The algorithm described in figure 8.1 was utilized in order to estimate parameters
that matched the target performance and quality. The attacks were measured by
computing the difference between the target and measured attack parameters. A
difference of 0 is ideal and indicates that the attack perfectly matched the attack
parameters.
The results of the performance for the three steganographic algorithms are
shown in figures 9.5a, 9.6a, and 9.7a. The results indicate the PFO DST attack was
capable of matching the target performance parameters, where nearly all attack
parameters were met or exceeded. As evident, certain attack parameters produced
a larger difference score than others, however, all performance differences were
greater than 0, which indicates that all attack parameters exceeded the target
performance metric. Note that certain combinations of attack parameters are
impractical or impossible to achieve. For example, consider a target performance
metric 0.05 (BER) and target quality metric of 0.7 (WSSIM). This combination means
that the quality of the media is rather low, while the steganographic performance
is high. This combination is difficult to achieve because it means the media has
been changed a lot (perceptually and numerically), but the performance of the
algorithm has remained high. For situations like this, we see that the performance
difference of the attack was greatly exceeded, which makes sense considering it is
an impractical combination to achieve.
The results of the quality for the three steganographic algorithms is shown
in figures 9.5b, 9.6b, and 9.7b. The results indicate that the PFO DST attack was
able to match the quality parameters of the attack. Again, all attack parameters
produced difference scores greater than 0. This is again explained by certain
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Figure 9.6: SVD Attack
unrealistic attack parameter combinations. Despite some of these non-zero scores,
they are expected and do not detract from the performance results of the attack.
The Cumulative Density Function (CDF) for the performance and quality of
these three attacks is shown in figure 9.8. Ideally, if the attack perfectly matched all
target attack parameters, the trend of the CDF would be a straight line. The CDF
trend shows the PFO DST attack was capable of matching the attack parameters in
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Figure 9.8: Simulation Results - CDF
a reasonable manner, as the CDF is zero for reasonable target metrics.
The importance of these results is not that the steganographic algorithms were
defeated (although this is certainly important) but that the attack vectors (BER
and WSSIM) were directly specified and achieved using the PFO DST attack. In
this manner, the PFO DST can be used to directly compute a tradeoff between
performance and quality to select an attack which is optimal for a particular target
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stego-media. When using approximations of the quality and performance for a
stego-media under attack, the PFO DST attack can be realistically achieved in a
real-world environment to ensure that performance and quality are maintained
for a particular attack. This approach to steganographic attacks is fundamentally
unique from other active approaches, and can be considered the optimal method
of removing stego-data from a cover media.
9.4.2 Multi-Vector Attack
Next, the MV-DST was simulated against various types of image-based stegano-
graphic algorithms. A set of 37 images from the SCISC [82] database were encoded
using three distinct steganographic algorithms which embed components using
Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), Rotation Scaling Translation (RST), and Singular
Value Decomposition (SVD)-based embedding techniques and attacked using the
MV-DST. These techniques represent various degrees of sophistication, where the
DCT embedding algorithm would be considered the most simplistic and fragile,
and the RST and SVD the most complex and robust. The MV-DST was limited
to image-based algorithms, as the most prolific and diverse algorithms are also
image-based, but the approach could easily implemented to non-2-dimensional
and non-image derived media as well.
To ease the computational complexity of the MV-DST, the Spring-Mesh Φ was
only implemented in the Γth (positional) dimension, meaning the amplitudinal
values of the media were left unaltered. ΦΓ may be observed in figure 9.9, and
remained static for all vectors.
The first attack was against a spread-spectrum based technique that embeds
steganographic data using a spreading sequence in the DCT coefficients of an
image [84]. This technique, while simple, is among a class of algorithms that is
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Figure 9.9: ΦΓ - Spring Mesh for Attack
extremely common. In fact, many prolific image-based steganographic algorithms
such as F5 [86], YASS [87], and OutGuess [68] are based on embedding within
a frequency-derived domain of an image. Figures 9.10a and 9.10b show the
results of the MV-DST, where the performance and quality of the media after the
attack was analyzed. The performance trend shows that as the reactivity ρ of Φ
increases the performance (as measured using Bit Error Rate (BER)) decreases. A
BER of 0.5 indicates that the steganographic data within the media is completely
unrecoverable. This indicates that as ρ is increased, the steganographic data
contained within is destroyed. Likewise, the quality of the media was observed
using the Weighted Structural Similarity Index (WSSIM). The quality trend shows
that as ρ is increased, the quality decreases as well, but maintains an acceptable
level of over 0.75 for all observed ρ.
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Figure 9.10: DCT MV-DST Attack
The second attack was targeted at a Singular Value Decomposition (SVD)-
based technique, where the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DVT) is used to embed
steganographic components in the cover media. SVD techniques typically operate
by performing SVD on a target block of a cover media, typically in a domain
such as the DWT, and embedding bits. The algorithm for this approach described
in [85] embeds bits using SVD of the HH block of the DWT domain. SVD-based
techniques [85, 88, 89] are typically considered more robust than simple DCT
and frequency-based techniques, at the cost of added complexity and reduced
capacity. The results for this attack are shown in figure 9.11, where the performance
and quality of the media under MV-DST are assessed. Figure 9.11a compares
the performance (BER) versus the reactivity, where the results indicate that the
performance decreases (BER approaches 0.5) as ρ increases. Likewise, the quality of
the encoded media was also measured, where the quality decreases but maintains
acceptable levels (WSSIM is greater than 0.75) as ρ increases. The results show that
the steganographic data was destroyed while maintaining acceptable quality levels
for all simulated ρ.
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Figure 9.11: SVD MV-DST Attack
The results for the third attack were against a Rotation Scaling Translation (RST)
resilient steganographic technique. RST techniques are capable of resisting attack
from basic image manipulation techniques that include simple affine transforma-
tions, as well as scaling and rotational operations [36, 81, 90]. These techniques
typically operate by embedding information within a domain of an image that
is guaranteed to remain static under RST operations. Such techniques are impor-
tant as they are among a class of algorithms that are capable of resisting active
steganographic attacks. The technique used is based on normalization domains
as described in [81], and embeds steganographic components in this RST-resilient
normalization domain. The results of this attack are shown in figures 9.12a and
9.12b, where the performance and quality were analyzed against the reactivity
ρ. Figure 9.12a shows the performance trend, where it can be observed that the
performance decreases (BER increases) as ρ increases. The BER approaches 0.5
as ρ increases, which indicates that the steganographic data within the media is
non-recoverable. Likewise, the performance was analyzed in figure 9.12b, where
the quality of the media versus ρ is shown. As ρ increases, the quality of the media
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(as measured in WSSIM) decreases, but remains high (above 0.75) for the range of
ρ.
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Figure 9.12: RST MV-DST Attack
The results of the MV-DST attacks show that the MV-DST was capable of
defeating the steganographic algorithms while maintaining a high perceptual
quality for all observed reactivity (ρ). An interesting observation is that the choice
of β did not significantly impact the quality of the media, where the trends for
each β were identical, yet the BER trends were impacted slightly. Since the choice
of β was relatively small (between 1 and 9), this was probably not a significant
impact on the quality and performance of the attacks. However, a choice of a larger
β could perhaps be used to further tune the target metrics of the MV-DST.
Interestingly, the RST-resilient technique, which was thought to have been the
most robust to active methods, had the worst performance of the three. This could
possibly be attributed to the fact the MV-DST does not have as much redundancy
as the others (it embeds fewer bits per message bit), however it also may indicate
that the MV-DST is distinct from simple RST image manipulation methods.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
The Discrete Spring Transform is an active steganographic attack that exploits
weaknesses in modern steganographic algorithms. The attack operates by dis-
rupting numeric components in a cover media while minimizing degradation to
perceptual quality. My research efforts have shown that steganographic algorithms
are easily disrupted by changes in their cover media’s numeric representation,
thus, by exploiting this shortcoming, our DST is able to render a cover media
unsuitable for carrying stego-data. Since the DST is an active attack, it can be
applied to any digital media and tuned using various properties that dictate the
strength and directionality of the attack. My numerous attack simulations have
shown that the DST is capable of defeating numerous types of steganographic
algorithms in a variety of cover media. These results correspondingly indicate
that the DST can render the effective BER of most steganographic algorithms to
approximately 0.5 (indicating complete randomness in the received of stego-data)
while maintaining strong perceptual quality of the cover media. The DST has even
defeated steganographic algorithms that are resistant to attack, further demon-
strating the effectiveness of the technique and how it is distinct from simple signal
processing operations.
The DST is unique from the vast majority of steganographic attacks in that it is
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active rather than passive. In modern, widely distributed communication networks,
such as the internet, passive attacks begin to breakdown since it is impractical to
globally assess and analyze suspect media on a case-by-case basis. An active attack
does not have such a restriction, and can be applied without prior knowledge or
study of suspected algorithms. The DST is distinguished from the small set of
active steganographic attacks in that it is the first attack that exploits perceptual
identity in media as a basis for attack. In other words, the DST exploits the fact
that two digital media can be rendered in perceptually identical, yet numerically
distinct ways. The DST thus renders a digital cover media unsuitable for carrying
steganographic data, and is unique in its perception-preserving approach that it
utilizes.
I believe that the Discrete Spring Transform can address shortcomings in
modern steganographic attacks. The DST employs a communications-theoretic
approach to defeating steganography that can be applied to virtually any digital
media containing virtually any type of stego-data. As a result, my research efforts
have shown that the DST is an effective steganographic attack that is capable of
defeating steganography in a variety of digital mediums in a highly efficient and
adaptable manner.
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